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CASE LAW
A. COURT OF JUSTICE
Case C-281/98, Roman Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA,
Judgment of 6 June 2000, not yet reported
1. Introduction
“It may seem surprising : : : that the Court has not to date had occasion
to comment on the application of Article 48 to employment conditions
specified by individual undertakings.”1
This understatement from Advocate General Fennelly characterizes the sub-
tlety with which the Court of Justice has grasped the nettle, now the occasion
has finally arisen. Whether it has been done as successfully as subtly requires
seriously to be considered, given the inevitable repercussions of the judgment.
2. Factual background
In much the same vein as Groener,2 the background to Angonese pits non-
discriminatory access to employment against the legitimacy of procedures
for determining linguistic competence. In August 1997, Mr Angonese – an
Italian national and resident of the autonomous province of Bolzano – applied
to enter into a competition for advertised posts with the Cassa di Risparmio,
a private banking undertaking in Bolzano. The advertisement had stipulated
that possession of a specific certificate of bilingualism in Italian and German
– known in Bolzano as the “patentino” and formerly required for access to
certain public service posts – was a condition for entry to the competition. The
patentino was issued solely by the public authorities in Bolzano, following
successful completion of both oral and written stages of an examination held
1. A.G. Fennelly at para 41 of his Opinion.
2. Case 379/87, Groener v. Minister for Education and the Dublin Vocational Education
Committee, [1989] ECR 3967.
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four times annually at an examination centre in the province. The requirement
imposed by the Cassa was a product of a national collective agreement for
savings banks, which allows individual institutions to establish procedures for
staff recruitment, including a decision as to whether recruitment is to be based
on “: : : an internal competition on the basis of either qualifications and/or
tests or in accordance with selection criteria specified by the institution.”3
Although residents of the province routinely obtain the certificate for purposes
of employment, Mr Angonese did not possess the patentino at the material
time. His mother tongue was German and the national court had found that
he was perfectly bilingual. He sought entry to the competition by submitting
inter alia certificates relating to his studies (through the medium of German)
of English, Polish and Slovene at the University of Vienna from 1993 to 1997,
although these studies had not led to the award of a degree. The Cassa refused
to admit him to the competition on the grounds that he was not a holder of
the patentino. Mr Angonese, in turn, claimed that the Cassa’s precondition of
possession of the patentino was unlawful in light of Community law on the
free movement of workers, citing arguments based on Article 39 (ex 48), and
Articles 3(1), 7(1) and 7(4) of Regulation 1612/68.4 The national court (the
Pretura Circondariale di Bolzano) therefore referred the following question
to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling under Article 234:
Is it compatible with Article 48(1), (2) and (3) of the EC Treaty and
Articles 3(1) and 7(1) and (4) of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 to make
the admission of candidates to a competition organized to fill posts in a
company governed by private law conditional on possession of the official
certificate attesting to knowledge of local languages issued exclusively
by a public authority of a Member State at a single examination centre
(namely, Bolzano), on completion of a procedure of considerable duration
(to be precise, of not less than 30 days, on account of the minimum lapse
of time envisaged between the written and the oral test)?
In Groener, the Court of Justice held that the implementation of language
policy by a Member State must not encroach upon the free movement of
workers;5 essentially, while it was deemed legitimate for Ireland to pursue
its official language policy objectives, the Court reserved the right to test that
policy for compliance with the general principles of non-discrimination and
proportionality where language requirements trenched upon the free move-
ment of Community workers. The case was decided substantively on the basis
of Article 3(1) of Regulation 1612/68, as the employer was an emanation of
the State. The Court found, on that occasion, that the linguistic competence
3. Angonese, at para 11.
4. Regulation 1612/68 J.O. 1968, L 257/2.
5. Groener, at para 19.
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requirement at issue could be justified “by reason of the nature of the post to
be filled” (Art. 3(1) of the Regulation) and was not, therefore, discriminatory;
but it did forewarn that “: : : the principle of non-discrimination precludes the
imposition of any requirement that the linguistic knowledge in question must
have been acquired within the national territory.”6 It was upon this dictum
that Mr Angonese principally relied. As in Groener, the right of the employer
to require evidence of linguistic competence was not challenged; rather, he
contested the rule that this requirement could be satisfied only by possession
of the patentino. The referring court also drew attention to the fact that the
way in which the patentino examination stages are structured made it unlikely
that a potential candidate who did not already possess the certificate could
have obtained one before the closing date for applications specified in the
advertisement. And given that the patentino is held almost exclusively by
residents of Bolzano, and so predominantly Italian nationals, its requirement
could constitute indirect discrimination on grounds of nationality. Drawing
from the reasoning of the Court in Groener, it would seem Mr Angonese had
a compelling case. But there were two fundamental differences here. First,
the employer was a private undertaking; second, Mr Angonese was seeking
to invoke a Community law right as against his own Member State. Both
aspects challenge the boundaries of the Court’s jurisprudence to date on the
free movement of workers.
3. The Judgment
The Court first brushed aside a question on the admissibility of the refer-
ence raised by the Italian Government and the Cassa, then determined that
Regulation 1612/68 did not apply (Art. 3(1) addressing laws, regulations or
administrative practices of a Member State, and so not in issue, and the collect-
ive agreement to which the Cassa was party neither requiring nor authorizing
the adoption of discriminatory criteria which would cause it to fall foul of
Art. 7(4)). The question fell therefore to be considered under Article 39 only.
The Court noted that the prohibition of discrimination based upon nationality
contained in Article 39 was in general terms, and not addressed to the Member
States. It then cited Walrave7 and Bosman8 as precedents for the application
of Article 39 to rules of private origin that restricted access to employment
upon a collective basis. Since rules governing access to employment may, as
a function of public or private regulation, vary from Member State to Member
6. Groener, at para 23.
7. Case 36/74, Walrave v. Union Cycliste Internationale, [1974] ECR 1405.
8. Case C-415/93, Union Royal Belge des Socie´te´s de Football Association v. Bosman,
[1995] ECR I-4921.
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State, limiting the application of Article 39 to the former would risk inequality
in its application. It was already established in Defrenne9 that Article 141 (ex
119) was capable of horizontal direct effect, and
“such considerations must, a fortiori, be applicable to Article [39 (ex 48)]
of the Treaty, which lays down a fundamental freedom and which con-
stitutes a specific application of the general prohibition of discrimination
contained in Article [12 (ex 6)] of the EC Treaty. In that respect, like
Article [141 (ex 119)] of the EC Treaty, it is designed to ensure that there
is no discrimination on the labour market.”10
Upon the basis of this reasoning, the Court then dropped its quiet bombshell:
“Consequently, the prohibition of discrimination on grounds of nationality
laid down in Article [39 (ex 48)] of the Treaty must be regarded as applying
to private persons as well.”11
As to whether the requirement imposed by the Cassa governing access to
the recruitment competition constituted discrimination contrary to Article 39,
whilst the requirement of linguistic knowledge and possession of a diploma
attesting to it was confirmed as prima facie legitimate, the fact that the
patentino was the only diploma recognized by the Cassa meant that persons
not resident in Bolzano would find it difficult or impossible to gain access
to employment with it. The majority of Bolzano residents are Italians, so
putting nationals of other Member States at a disadvantage in comparison
with residents of Bolzano, notwithstanding Italians not resident in Bolzano
being at the same disadvantage. Such discrimination could be saved only if
objectively justified on grounds unrelated to nationality that satisfied the test
of proportionality; the fact that candidates were barred from producing proof
of linguistic ability by other means, particularly equivalent qualifications from
other Member States, was, following Groener, held to be disproportionate,
and so the requirement of evidence of linguistic knowledge “exclusively by
means of one particular diploma : : : issued only in one particular province
of a Member State”12 was held to constitute discrimination on grounds of
nationality, contrary to Article 39.
4. Comment
The importance of the judgment lies most clearly in what it says about the
effects of Article 39. But it is also noteworthy in what it doesn’t say. It
9. Case 43/75, Defrenne v. Sabena, [1976] ECR 455.
10. Angonese, at para 35.
11. Angonese, at para 36.
12. Angonese, at para 45.
Court of Justice 1241
is established law that the rules on free movement of persons and services
have no relevance absent a “significant Community element”. This is no high
hurdle to clear in the context of services which necessarily address trans-
frontier elements, even latterly to the extent of national rules applying to
persons resident and established in one State insofar as they may inhibit
the provision of services elsewhere.13 But it is (or was) clear in the context
of Article 39 and Article 43 (ex 52) that the Treaty had no relevance or
application to situations which were “wholly internal” (or “purely internal”)
to a Member State.14 Inroads against this general principle have been made,
first, with the line of authority first articulated in Knoors,15 to the effect
that a harmonization directive adopted by the Council under Articles 40, 47
and/or 52 (ex 49, 57 and 63) will create a sufficient Community element for
purposes of recognition of a diploma the subject matter of the directive, and
second, with Bouchoucha,16 Kraus17 and Ferna´ndez de Bobadilla,18 each
involving the recognition by a Community national’s home Member State
of the equivalence of a diploma gained in another Member State, the fact of
the foreign qualification triggering the requisite Community element.19 For
simple residence, the breakthrough came with Singh,20 in which the Court
held that where a Community (British) national had, in the exercise of a Treaty
right under Article 39, worked in another Member State (Germany) with her
non-Community (Indian) husband but subsequently returned to the United
Kingdom in order to (re)establish herself there (in the sense of Art. 43), the
husband continued to enjoy the same right of residence in the United Kingdom
(by virtue of Directive 73/14821) that he had enjoyed in Germany (by virtue of
13. Case C-18/93, Corsica Ferries Italia v. Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova, [1994]
ECR I-1783; Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments v. Minister van Financie¨n, [1995] ECR I-
1141. This applies equally to rules which might inhibit a home national from establishing him
or herself in another Member State; Case C-251/98, Baars v. Inspecteur der Belastingdienst,
Gorinchem, judgment of 13 April 2000, nyr.
14. The relevant case law began with Case 175/78, R v. Saunders, [1979] ECR 1129; see
the subsequent judgments cited by A.G. Fennelly at footnote 12 of his Opinion in Angonese.
15. Case 115/78, Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, [1979] ECR 399.
16. Case C-61/89, Criminal Proceedings against Bouchoucha, [1990] ECR I-3551.
17. Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, [1993] ECR I-1663.
18. Case C-234/97, Ferna´ndez de Bobadilla v. Museo Nacional del Prado, [1999] ECR
I-4773.
19. See Bouchoucha at para 11: “It must be pointed out that : : :Mr Bouchoucha, a French
national practising in France, holds a professional diploma issued in another Member State.
It follows that the scope of the present case is not purely national and the applicability of the
EEC Treaty provisions on freedom of establishment much be considered.” To the same effect,
see Kraus at para 15 and Ferna´ndez de Bombadilla at para 30.
20. Case C-370/90, R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Singh, ex parte Secretary of State
for the Home Department, [1992] ECR I-4265.
21. Directive 73/148 O.J. 1973, L 172/14 (residence under establishment and services).
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Directive 68/36022); he “ : : :must enjoy at least the same rights as would be
granted to him or her under Community law if his or her spouse entered and
resided in the territory of another Member State.”23 Otherwise, a Community
national might be deterred from exercising to the full the Community rights
to which he or she is entitled.
Singh is a particularly vermicular can of worms. There was a fair and fairly
apparent Community element in the Singhs’ adventures: they had lived and
worked together (so exercising a Treaty right) in Germany and they co-owned
the undertaking established in the UK (although they were in the final throes
of a divorce). But how far can the principle extend? Has a Belgian who went
on holiday to Crete 15 years ago, or from time to time watches TF1 on cable
television – both involving the exercise of a Community right – earned the
right to invoke Articles 39 or 43 and their attendant legislation in Belgium?
Bosman – following which a transfer fee from one football club to another
within the same Member State (and upon a footballer who was a national
of that State) remained exigible (unless contrary to Arts. 81 or 82, a point
addressed by A.G. Lenz but not by the Court) – may have refashioned Article
39 significantly, but does not grapple with this anomaly. The issue is to the
fore again in Carpenter,24 in which the non-Community spouse of a British
national is claiming a Community right of residence with her in the UK by
virtue of the fact that she supplies services from time to time in other Member
States.
In Angonese, the issue did not even arise for consideration. The Court stated
that it was “far from clear that the interpretation of Community law : : : has
no relation to the actual facts of the case or to the subject-matter of the main
action”, but this was simply to dismiss the claim of the inadmissibility of the
reference.25 Thereafter the point is not mentioned, though it had formed the
basis of Advocate General Fennelly’s Opinion.26 It must be said that the Com-
munity element in Angonese is less convincing than that both in Kraus and
in Singh; the Commission admitted that “the existence of a connection with
Community law is difficult with respect to existing case law”,27 recognized
that its reasoning (supporting a finding of such a connection here) “might
appear bold” in the light of it,28 and acknowledged that it “would represent a
22. Directive 68/360 J.O. 1968, L 257/13 (right of residence for workers).
23. Singh, at para 25.
24. Case C-60/00, Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, pending; for
the questions put to the ECJ see O.J. 2000, C 122/14.
25. Angonese, at para 19.
26. A.G. Fennelly effectively accepted the merits of Mr Angonese’s substantive claim (see
para 43 of his Opinion) but rejected the case as “entirely hypothetical”, given the absence, in
his view, of a sufficient connection with Community law.
27. Para 35 of the Report for the Hearing.
28. Para 38 of the Report for the Hearing.
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significant new step in the case law”.29 Mr Angonese had studied in Vienna,
although prior to 1995 this could generate no Community element as Austria
had yet to accede; it therefore cannot have been his original intention, if it is
material, to exercise a Community right. In any event, he earned no diploma.
It was the finding of the Pretura that he spoke German fluently; but he could
speak it like Goethe and it would avail him little as a matter of Community
law absent an appreciable Community element. The simple answer to this is
that the Court played a straight bat, and supplied a straight answer to a straight
question: the dispositif says simply that Article 39 precludes a requirement of
possession of a particular diploma issued only in one particular province of a
Member State. It is entirely possible (and likely) that the Pretura will dispose
of the case by finding that Mr Angonese has no diploma of any sort and was
therefore not improperly barred from the competition.30 The fact remains that
the Court, unlike Advocate General Fennelly, did not address the “appreciable
Community element” question; the result is, therefore, uncomfortably vague
and incomplete. But it may also reflect an unwillingness further to comprom-
ise internal Member State autonomy and sensibilities. How far Mr Carpenter
can force the Court’s hand remains to be seen.
The primary importance of the judgment is, of course, that Article 39 is
(we now know) horizontally directly effective. This is a course which had
been urged upon the Court by a number of academic writers,31 and it may be
a logical, perhaps irresistible, consequence of the pebbles loosed downhill in
Walrave and then Bosman. However, it goes significantly beyond them. It may
be a fairly seamless progression to extend a prohibition of (apparently) State
discrimination in employment law to private agreements which universally
and de facto compulsorily regulate access to employment in a given sphere
(Bosman); in fact, Bosman is in ways less iconoclastic than the Marshall
construct which binds emanations of the State to directive obligations even
in their private law (contracts of employment) relationships.32 But Angonese
leaps a far wider synapse than either Bosman or Marshall to embrace dis-
crimination the freely chosen option of a private employer. It is true that the
29. Para 10 of the Opinion.
30. This is consistent with the general thrust of the rules on mutual recognition, which
measure not knowledge but qualifications. Support for the likelihood of this result can be
gleaned from para 44 of the judgment, where the Court refers to “in particular by equivalent
qualifications obtained in other Member States” (emphasis added). A.G. Fennelly had applied
a different slant in this context, assessing the substance of the studies abroad rather than the
ultimate (non-)existence of a diploma or certificate; see paras 27–30 of his Opinion.
31. E.g. Roth, “Drittwirkung der Grundfreiheiten?”, in Due, Lutter and Schwarze (Eds.),
Festschrift fu¨r Ulrich Everling, vol. II (1995, Nomos), p. 1231, 1237 et seq; Kluth, “Die
Bindung privater Wirtschaftsteilnehmer an die Grundfreiheiten des EG-Vertragen”, 122 Ao¨R
(1997) 557, 566 et seq.
32. Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and Southwest Hampshire Area Health Author-
ity, [1986] ECR 723.
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conduct of the Cassa di Risparmio was grounded originally in a national
collective agreement, and collective agreements have (tentatively) been held
to fall within Article 39;33 but it clear that adherence to the terms of the
agreement at issue was entirely optional, so much so that the Court dismissed
the application of Article 7(4) of Regulation 1612/68 out of hand.34 Angonese
is therefore a clear extension of Article 39 and an irrefutable recognition, and
ex cathedra pronouncement, of an obligation imposed directly upon private
employers.
But whilst the edifice partly built in Walrave and Bosman is now completed,
the architecture is nonetheless shaky. The logic deployed by the Court boils
down simply to the following: disharmony between Member States as the
result of public/private regulation of access to the labour market is undesirable,
Article 141 has horizontal direct effect, the principle ought to apply no less to
Article 39, and so it does. But whether this justifies the result and the burdens
now recognized to be borne by all employers, public and private, may be
queried. There is disharmony in many areas of Community law – the uniform
application of (unimplemented or incorrectly implemented) directives being
only the most obvious example – which is not cured by the Court. The
repercussions of Angonese are myriad and apparent: it extends the reach of
Community law even more deeply into employment law; it will inevitably
engender a new raft of litigation from disgruntled employees (or prospective
employees). Now, all private employers in all Member States must afford
Community law standards to migrant workers whilst not obliged to do so for
home nationals. Whilst this is laudable in terms of increased protection for
Community workers, the continuing wisdom of the “wholly internal” rule and
its reverse discrimination seems more incoherent and increasingly untenable.
This overlaps with the debate evolving elsewhere, on the extent to which
the Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights in the European Union should be
binding within the Member States. As to fundamental rights already recog-
nized in the case law of the Court of Justice, this is something of a moot
point where the application and implementation of Community law is in
question. What is perhaps thrown into focus by Angonese, however, is the
extent to which the reach of Community law is far from settled. Already a
situation that can be linked to Community law activates rights not applicable
in a purely domestic or internal matter. From the perspective of the migrant
Community worker, the horizontal direct effect of Article 39 certainly gener-
ates yet another dimension of protection; but in the current political climate,
and particularly in but not restricted to the UK, the judgment could be inter-
preted as yet another blatant intrusion into the preserve of national regulation.
33. Case C-234/97, Ferna´ndez de Bobadilla, supra note 18.
34. Angonese, at paras 23–27.
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However, given that the threshold beyond which Community law can come
into play has been rolled back extensively, if subtly (stealthily?), in recent
years, is it tenable, for the effective protection of individual rights, to resist
the application of Community rights in situations still “purely internal”? The
Court seems increasingly to be prepared to accept arguably tenuous links to
Community law in order to grant the corollary protection available, meaning
that the limits still recognized appear more and more arbitrary by compar-
ison. This may be construed as the taking of free movement to its “logical”
conclusion, but it is surely both politically and pragmatically questionable.
Indeed, Advocate General Fennelly alluded to the latter consideration in his
Opinion.35
When considering whether Article 39 can bind private employers, Advoc-
ate General Fennelly drew a distinction between allegations of direct and
indirect discrimination, concluding that the prohibition of indirect discrim-
ination “may present special problems and difficulties in the case of private
economic actors”.36 He did not elaborate further. In any event, the Court
placed no such limitation on the horizontal application of Article 39. The
Advocate General’s suggestion can be taken to have been implicitly rejected,
given that the discrimination alleged in Angonese was indirect. This issue is
analogous with the direct effect of Article 141 and Defrenne, upon which the
Court drew significantly in the present case, where horizontal direct effect was
confined initially to “direct and overt” discrimination.37 The Court’s u-turn
in Jenkins marks, on the one hand, an advance, in that indirect discrimination
by private employers is now deemed to be caught by Article 141.38 How-
ever, the corollary introduction of objective justification in this context – a
necessarily nebulous concept which appears relatively easy to satisfy from
the employer’s perspective – has muddied the waters somewhat, even more
so considering that the substantive judgment falls invariably to be decided by
the national courts.39 Perhaps the Advocate General was attempting to steer
the path of Article 39 away from the pitfalls already problematic in the field of
equal pay. Further, whilst Article 39(2) relates to the abolition of discrimina-
tion regarding “employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and
employment”, Angonese addresses eligibility for employment, traditionally
the preserve of Regulation 1612/68. The Court stated expressly that Article
35. At paras 9 and 31.
36. At para 41 of his Opinion.
37. Defrenne, at paras. 18 and 40.
38. Case 96/80, Jenkins v. Kingsgate (Clothing Productions) Ltd., [1981] ECR 911, at paras.
9–14.
39. See the line of cases beginning with Case 170/84, Bilka-Kaufhaus v. von Hartz, [1986]
ECR 1607 and Case 171/88, Rinner-Ku¨hn v. FWW Spezial-Geba¨udereinigung, [1989] ECR
2743.
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3(1) of Regulation 1612/68 – the provision on which its decision in Groener
rests – does not apply to the conduct of private undertakings. But it renders
the provision applicable in effect via the horizontal direct effect of Article 39.
This is an issue that arose also in respect of the breadth of Article 141, which
was extended implicitly by the wider detail of Article 1 of Directive 75/11740
being absorbed into it.41 The same may well come to pass here. Finally, we
now know that Article 141 is horizontally directly effective and Article 39 is
horizontally directly effective. The obvious question to ask is simply, what
next?
In reality, the aspects of Angonese that relate to the actual essence of the
case – language policy and regional autonomy – are likely to be overshad-
owed by the considerations discussed above. The substantive decision can
hardly, following on from Groener, be seen as surprising. But the judgment
is unlikely to receive a warm welcome in Bolzano. Language is a politic-
ally sensitive issue in any context, but perhaps even more so where it is so
intimately connected with the preservation and evolution of regional culture.
The Court of Justice has always been careful to stress that the protection of
a linguistic minority is a legitimate objective per se; and, as noted, the right
of an employer to include language requirements in its recruitment selec-
tion criteria is prima facie justified and justifiable. But, on the other hand,
the Court’s assessment of domestic language policy is frequently perceived
as an unwarranted intrusion. This point may be further illustrated by refer-
ence to its judgment in Bickel and Franz,42 where, under Community law,
an Austrian worker and a German tourist were both found to be entitled to
have criminal proceedings against them in Bolzano conducted through the
medium of the German language, a right usually accorded to residents of the
province only. The extent to which regional autonomy in the administration
of language policy is delineated in Italy is demonstrated by the fact that it
was considered preferable by the Italian Government that the proceedings
be conducted in Italian via the use of interpreters; significantly, this would
have met the standard of protection required by the European Convention
on Human Rights.43 Both the Court of Justice and Advocate General Jacobs
confirmed that protection of a linguistic minority was a wholly legitimate
aim; as in Groener, however, a Member State’s language policy was reviewed
against the Community law requirements of non-discrimination and propor-
40. Directive 75/117 O.J. 1975, L 45/19 (the equal pay Directive).
41. Case 96/80, Jenkins, supra note 38.
42. Case C-274/96, Criminal Proceedings Against Bickel and Franz, [1998] ECR I-7637.
43. Art. 6(3)(e) ECHR guarantees that everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
right to the free assistance of an interpreter if s/he cannot understand or speak the language
used in court. The Italian Government referred also to the similar protection guaranteed by
Art. 14(3)(f) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Court of Justice 1247
tionality in the context of free movement. In particular, the Advocate General
pointed to the irony that “[r]efusing the use of German to visitors does not
in any way serve [the aim of protecting a linguistic minority]. If anything,
it has the reverse effect: it reinforces Italian as the principal language even
in the predominantly German-speaking region of Bolzano.”44 The idea that
an issue can be considered as “purely internal” is not confined to the realm
of the Member State. And an additional factor must be taken into account in
the context of regional government. The channels through which sub-national
authorities can participate in EC decision-making are effectively controlled by
the internal constitutional structures of the Member States – yet the policies of
sub-national authorities are clearly subject to the application of Community
law and principles. This is, to put it at its lowest, unsatisfactory.
Mr Angonese will now join the annals of Community law pioneers, along-
side Ms Defrenne, Miss Marshall and Mr Bosman. The irony is that whilst
ultimately the claims of his predecessors prevailed, it is unlikely that he will
gain any benefit himself from the legal breakthrough he has wrought.
Robert Lane and Niamh Nic Shuibhne
44. Bickel and Franz, per A.G. Jacobs at para 41 of his Opinion.
 Faculty of Law, University of Edinburgh.
